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Abstract
Machine learning (ML), especially deep neural networks
(DNNs) have been widely used in various applications, in-
cluding several safety-critical ones (e.g. autonomous driv-
ing). As a result, recent research about adversarial exam-
ples has raised great concerns. Such adversarial attacks
can be achieved by adding a small magnitude of perturba-
tion to the input to mislead model prediction. While sev-
eral whitebox attacks have demonstrated their effectiveness,
which assume that the attackers have full access to the ma-
chine learning models; blackbox attacks are more realis-
tic in practice. In this paper, we propose a Query-Efficient
Boundary-based blackbox Attack (QEBA) based only on
model’s final prediction labels. We theoretically show why
previous boundary-based attack with gradient estimation
on the whole gradient space is not efficient in terms of query
numbers, and provide optimality analysis for our dimension
reduction-based gradient estimation. On the other hand, we
conducted extensive experiments on ImageNet and CelebA
datasets to evaluate QEBA. We show that compared with
the state-of-the-art blackbox attacks, QEBA is able to use a
smaller number of queries to achieve a lower magnitude
of perturbation with 100% attack success rate. We also
show case studies of attacks on real-world APIs including
MEGVII Face++ and Microsoft Azure.
1. Introduction
Recent developments of machine learning (ML), es-
pecially deep neural networks (DNNs), have advanced a
number of real-world applications, including object de-
tection [30], drug discovery [8], and robotics [22]. In
the meantime, several safety-critical applications have also
adopted ML, such as autonomous driving vehicles [7] and
surgical robots [31, 32]. However, recent research have
shown that machine learning systems are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples, which are inputs with small magnitude
of adversarial perturbations added and therefore cause ar-
∗The first two authors contribute equally. This work was done while
they were interns at Ant Financial. To appear at CVPR 2020. The code is
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bitrarily incorrect predictions during test time [13, 40, 4,
14, 5, 6]. Such adversarial attacks have led to great con-
cerns when applying ML to real-world applications. Thus
in-depth analysis of the intrinsic properties of these adver-
sarial attacks as well as potential defense strategies are re-
quired.
First, such attacks can be categorized into whitebox and
blackbox attacks based on the attacker’s knowledge about
the victim ML model. In general, the whitebox attacks are
possible by leveraging the gradient of the model — methods
like fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [14], optimization
based attack [4], projected gradient descent based method
(PGD) [25] have been proposed. However, whitebox at-
tack is less practical, given the fact that most real-world
applications will not release the actual model they are us-
ing. In addition, these whitebox attacks are shown to be de-
fendable [25]. As a result, blackbox adversarial attack have
caught a lot of attention in these days. In blackbox attack,
based on whether an attacker needs to query the victim ML
model, there are query-free (e.g. transferability based at-
tack) and query-based attacks. Though transferability based
attack does not require query access to the model, it as-
sumes the attacker has access to the large training data to
train a substitute model, and there is no guarantee for the
attack success rate. The query based attack includes score-
based and boundary-based attacks. Score-based attack as-
sumes the attacker has access to the class probabilities of
the model, which is less practical compared with boundary-
based attack which only requires the final model prediction,
while both require large number of queries.
In this paper, we propose Query-Efficient Boundary-
based blackbox Attack (QEBA) based only on model’s fi-
nal prediction labels as a general framework to minimize
the query number. Since the gradient estimation consumes
the majority of all the queries, the main challenge of re-
ducing the number of queries for boundary-based black-
box attack is that a high-dimensional data (e.g. an image)
would require large number of queries to probe the deci-
sion boundary. As a result, we propose to search for a small
representative subspace for query generation. In particular,
queries are generated by adding perturbations to an image.
We explore the subspace optimization methods from three
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Figure 1: Pipeline of QEBA. In this example, the attack goal is to obtain an adv-image that looks like a cat (target-image)
but be misclassified as a fish (ymal). We start from a source-image together with an optimized subspace. We then iterativelly
perform gradient estimation with queries, move along the estimated direction, and project the new instance to the decision
boundary by binary search towards the target-image till converge. The grey solid arrows indicate steps within each iteration.
In particular, we show a toy example of how the source-image (purple rectangles) is moved towards the target-image (green
rectangles), while the intermediate projected boundary-image is shown as red rectangles.
novel perspectives for perturbation sampling: 1) spatial, 2)
frequency, and 3) intrinsic component. The first one lever-
ages spatial transformation (e.g. linear interpolation) so that
the sampling procedure can take place in a low-dimensional
space and then project back to the original space. The sec-
ond one uses intuition from image compression literature
and samples from low frequency subspace and use discrete
consine transformation (DCT) [15] to project back. The fi-
nal one performs scalable gradient matrix decomposition to
select the major principle components via principle compo-
nent analysis (PCA) [39] as subspace to sample from. In
addition , we theoretically prove the optimality of them on
estimating the gradient compared with estimating the gradi-
ent directly over the original space.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed black-
box attack QEBA methods, we conduct extensive exper-
iments on high dimensional image data including Ima-
geNet [11] and CelebA [24]. We perform attacks on the
ResNet model [17], and show that compared with the-state-
of-the-art blackbox attack methods, the different variations
of QEBA can achieve lower magnitude of perturbation with
smaller number of queries (attack success rate 100%). In
order to show the real-world impact of the proposed attacks,
we also perform QEBA against online commercial APIs
including MEGVII Face++[26] and Microsoft Azure[28].
Our methods can successfully attack the APIs with pertur-
bations of reasonable magnitude. Towards these different
subspaces, our conjecture is that the over-all performance
on different subspaces depends on multiple factors includ-
ing dataset size, model smoothness, adversarial attack goals
etc. Therefore, our goal here is to make the first attempt to-
wards providing sufficient empirical observations for these
three subspaces, while further extensive studies are required
to compare different factors of these subspaces, as well as
identifying new types of subspaces.
The contributions of this work are summarized as fol-
lows: 1) We propose a general Query-Efficient Boundary-
based blackbox Attack QEBA to reduce the number of
queries based on boundary-based attack. The QEBA con-
tains three variations based on three different representa-
tive subspaces including spatial transformed subspace, low
frequency subspace, and intrinsic component subspace; 2)
We theoretically demonstrate that gradient estimation in the
whole gradient space is inefficient in terms of query num-
bers, and we prove the optimality analysis for our proposed
query-efficient gradient estimation methods; 3) We conduct
comprehensive experiments on two high resolution image
datasets: ImageNet and CelebA. All the different variations
of QEBA outperform the state-of-the-art baseline method
by a large margin; 4) We successfully attack two real-world
APIs including Face++[26] and Azure[28] and showcase
the effectiveness of QEBA.
2. Problem Definition
Consider a k-way image classification model f(x)
where x ∈ Rm denotes the input image with dimension m,
and f(x) ∈ Rk represents the vector of confidence scores
of the image belonging to each classes. In boundary-based
black-box attacks, the attacker can only inquire the model
with queries {xi} (a series of updated images) and get the
predicted labels y˜i = F (xi) = argmaxj [f(xi)]j , where
[f ]j represents the score of the j-th class. The parameters
in the model f and the score vector s are not accessible.
There is a target-image xtgt with a benign label yben.
Based on the malicious label ymal of their choice, the ad-
versary will start from a source-image xsrc selected from
the category with label ymal, and move xsrc towards xtgt
on the pixel space while keeping ymal to guarantee the at-
tack. An image that is on the decision boundary between the
two classes (e.g. yben and ymal) and is classified as ymal is
called boundary-image.
The adversary’s goal is to find an adversarial image(adv-
image) xadv such that F (xadv) = ymal and D(xtgt,xadv)
is as small as possible, where D is the distance metric (usu-
ally L2-norm or L∞-norm distance). By definition, adv-
image is a boundary-image with an optimized (minimal)
distance from the target-image. In the paper we focus on
targeted attack and the approaches can extend to untargeted
scenario naturally.
3. Query-Efficient Boundary-based blackbox
Attack (QEBA)
In this section we first introduce the pipeline of QEBA
which is based on HopSkipJumpAttack (HSJA) [9]. We
then illustrate the three proposed query reduction ap-
proaches in detail. We provide the theoretic justification
of QEBA in Section 4. The pipeline of the proposed
Query-Efficient Boundary-based blackbox Attack (QEBA)
is shown in Figure 1 as an illustrative example. The goal
is to produce an adv-image that looks like xtgt (cat) but is
mislabeled as the malicious label (fish) by the victim model.
First, the attack initializes the adv-image with xsrc. Then
it performs an iterative algorithm consisting of three steps:
estimate gradient at decision boundary which is based
on the proposed representative subspace, move along esti-
mated gradient, and project to decision boundary which
aims to move towards xtgt.
First, define the adversarial prediction score S and the
indicator function φ as:
Sxtgt(x) = [f(x)]ymal − max
y 6=ymal
[f(x)]y, (1)
φxtgt(x) = sign(Sxtgt(x)) =
{
1 if Sxtgt(x) ≥ 0;
−1 otherwise.
(2)
We abbreviate the two functions as S(x) and φ(x) if it does
not cause confusion. In boundary-based attack, the attacker
is only able to get the value of φ but not S.
In the following, we first introduce the three interative
steps in the attack in Section 3.1, then introduce three dif-
ferent methods for generating the optimized representative
subspace in Section 3.2-3.4.
3.1. General framework of QEBA
Estimate gradient at decision boundary Denote x(t)adv as
the adv-image generated in the t-th step. The intuition in
Figure 2: Query model and estimate gradient near the deci-
sion boundary.
this step is that we can estimate the gradient of S(x(t)adv) us-
ing only the access to φ if x(t)adv is at the decision boundary.
This gradient can be sampled via Monte Carlo method:
∇˜S = 1
B
B∑
i=1
φ(x
(t)
adv + δub)ub (3)
where {ub} are B randomly sampled perturbations with
unit length and δ is a small weighting constant. An example
of this process is shown in Figure 2. The key point here is
how to sample the perturbation ub’s and we propose to draw
from a representative subspace in Rn.
Formally speaking, let W = [w1, . . . , wn] ∈ Rm×n be
n orthonormal basis vectors in Rm, meaning W ᵀW = I .
Let span(W ) ⊆ Rm denote the n-dimensional subspace
spanned by w1, . . . , wn. We would like to sample random
perturbations from span(W ) instead of from the original
space Rm. In order to do that, we sample vb ∈ Rn from
unit sphere in Rn and let ub =Wvb. The detailed gradient
estimation algorithm is shown in Alg.1. Note that if we let
span(W ) = Rm, this step will be the same as in [9]. How-
ever, we will sample from some representative subspace so
that the gradient estimation is more efficient, and the corre-
sponding theoretic justification is discussed in Section 4.
Move along estimated gradient After we have estimated
the gradient of adversarial prediction score ∇S, we will
move the x(t)adv towards the gradient direction:
xˆt+1 = x
(t)
adv + ξt ·
∇˜S
||∇˜S||2
(4)
where ξt is the step size at the t-th step. Hence, the predic-
tion score of the adversarial class will be increased.
Project to decision boundary Current xˆt+1 is beyond the
boundary, we can move the adv-image towards the target
image so that it is projected back to the decision boundary:
x
(t+1)
adv = αt · xtgt + (1− αt) · xˆt+1 (5)
where the projection is achieved by a binary search over αt.
Algorithm 1 Gradient Approximation Based QEBA
Input: a data point on the decision boundary x ∈ Rm,
basis of the subspace W ∈ Rm×n, number of ran-
dom samplingB, access to query the decision of victim
model φ.
Output: the approximated gradient G
1: sampleB random Gaussian vectors of the lower dimen-
sion: Vrnd ∈ RB×n.
2: project the random vectors onto the gradient basis to get
the perturbation vectors: Urnd = Vrnd ·W ᵀ.
3: get query points by adding perturbation vectors with the
original point on the decision boundary: xq[i] = x +
Urnd[i].
4: Monte Carlo approximation for the gradient: G =
1
B
∑B
i=1 φ(xq[i]) · Urnd[i]
5: return G
Note that we assume x(t)adv lies on the boundary while
xsrc does not lie on the boundary. Therefore, in the initial-
ization step we need to first apply a project operation as in
Eqn. 5 to get x(0)adv .
In the following sections, we will introduce three ex-
ploration for the representative subspace optimization from
spatial, frequency, and intrinsic component perspectives.
3.2. Spatial Transformed Subspace (QEBA-S)
First we start with the spatial transformed query reduc-
tion approach. The intuition comes from the observation
that the gradient of input image has a property of local
similarity[20]. Therefore, a large proportion of the gradi-
ents lies on the low-dimensional subspace spanned by the
bilinear interpolation operation[34]. In order to sample ran-
dom perturbations for an image, we first sample a lower-
dimensional random perturbation Q of shape bNr c × bNr c,
where r is the hyperparameter of dimension reduction fac-
tor. Then we use bilinear-interpolation to map it back the
original image space, X = Bil Interp(Q).
The basis of this spatial transformed subspace is the im-
ages transformed from unit perturbations in the lower space:
w(i,j) = Bil Interp(e(i,j)), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ bN/rc
where e(i,j) represents the unit vector that has 1 on the
(i, j)-th entry and 0 elsewhere.
3.3. Low Frequency Subspace (QEBA-F)
In general the low frequency subspace of an image con-
tains the most of the critical information, including the
gradient information[15]; while the high frequency signals
contain more noise than useful content. Hence, we would
like to sample our perturbations from the low frequency
subspace via Discrete Cosine Transformation(DCT)[1].
Figure 3: Generate representative subspace from the origi-
nal high-dimensional gradient space.
Formally speaking, define the basis function of DCT as:
φ(i, j) = cos
(
(i+ 12 )j
N
pi
)
(6)
The inverse DCT transformation is a mapping from the fre-
quency domain to the image domain X = IDCT(Q):
Xi1,i2 =
N−1∑
j1=0
N−1∑
j2=0
Nj1Nj2Qj1,j2φ(i1, j1)φ(i2, j2) (7)
where Nj =
√
1/N if j = 0 and otherwise Nj =
√
2/N .
We will use the lower bN/rc part of the frequency do-
main as the subspace, i.e.
w(i,j) = IDCT(e(i,j)), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ bN/rc (8)
where hyperparameter r is the dimension reduction factor.
3.4. Intrinsic Component Subspace (QEBA-I)
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)[39] is a standard
way to perform dimension reduction in order to search for
the intrinsic components of the given instances. Given a set
of data points in high dimensional space, PCA aims to find
a lower dimensional subspace so that the projection of the
data points onto the subspace is maximized.
Therefore, it is possible to leverage PCA to optimize the
subspace for model gradient matrix. However, in order to
perform PCA we will need a set of data points. In our
case that should be a set of gradients of S(x) w.r.t. dif-
ferent x. This is not accessible under black-box setting.
Hence, we turn to a set of ‘reference models’ to whose
gradient we have access. As shown in Figure 3, we will
use a reference model to calculate a set of image gradients
g1,g2, . . . ,gK ∈ Rm Then we perform a PCA to extract
its top-n principal components - w1, . . . ,wn ∈ Rm. These
w’s are the basis of the Intrinsic Component Subspace. Note
that different from transferability, we do not restrict the ref-
erence models to be trained by the same training data with
the original model, since we only need to search for the in-
trinsic components of the give dataset which is relatively
stable regarding diverse models.
In practice, the calculation of PCA may be challeng-
ing in terms of time and memory efficiency based on large
high-dimensional dataset (the data dimension on ImageNet
is over 150k and we need a larger number of data points,
all of which are dense). Therefore, we leverage the ran-
domized PCA algorithms[16] which accelerates the speed
of PCA while achieving comparable performance.
An additional challenge is that the matrix X may be too
large to be stored in memory. Therefore, we store them by
different rows since each row (i.e. gradient of one image)
is calculated independently with the others. The multipli-
cation of X and other matrices in memory are then imple-
mented accordingly.
4. Theoretic Analysis on QEBA
We theoretically analyze how dimension reduction helps
with the gradient estimation in QEBA. We show that the
gradient estimation bound is tighter by sampling from a rep-
resentative subspace rather than the original space.
We consider the gradient estimation as in Eqn. 3 and let
ρ =
||projspan(W )(∇S)||2
||∇S||2 denote the proportion of ∇S that lies
on the chosen subspace span(W ). Then we have the fol-
lowing theorem on the expectation of the cosine similarity
between ∇S and estimated ∇˜S:
Theorem 1. Suppose 1) S(x) has L-Lipschitz gradients in
a neighborhood of x, 2) the sampled v1, . . . ,vB are or-
thogonal to each other, and 3)W ᵀW = I , then the expected
cosine simliarity between ∇˜S and ∇S can be bounded by:(
2
(
1− ( Lδ
2||∇S||2 )
2
)n−1
2
− 1
)
cnρ
√
B
n
(9)
≤E[ cos(∇˜S,∇S)] (10)
≤cnρ
√
B
n
(11)
where cn is a coefficient related with the subspace dimen-
sion n and can be bounded by cn ∈ (2/pi, 1). In particular:
lim
δ→0
E
[
cos(∇˜WS,∇S)
]
= cnρ
√
B
n
. (12)
The theorem proof is in Appendix A. If we sample from
the entire space (i.e. span(W ) = Rm), the expected cosine
similarity is cm
√
B
m . If we let m = 3 × 224 × 224 and
B = 100, the similarity is only around 0.02.
On the other hand, if the subspace basis w’s are ran-
domly chosen, then ρ ≈ √ nm and the estimation quality
is low. With larger ρ, the estimation quality will be better
than sampling from the entire space. Therefore, we fur-
ther explore three approaches to optimize the representative
subspace that contains a larger portion of the gradient as
discussed in Section 3. For example, in the experiments
we see that when n = m/16, we can reach ρ = 0.5 and the
expected cosine similarity increase to around 0.06. This im-
proves the gradient estimation quality which leads to more
efficient attacks.
5. Experiments
In this section, we introduce our experimental setup
and quantitative results of the proposed methods QEBA-S,
QEBA-F, and QEBA-I, compared with the HSJA attack[9],
which is the-state-of-the-art boundary-based blackbox at-
tack. Here we focus on the strongest baseline HSJA, which
outperforms all of other Boundary Attack [2], Limited At-
tack [19] and Opt Attack [10] by a substantial margin. We
also show two sets of qualitative results for attacking two
real-world APIs with the proposed methods.
5.1. Datasets and Experimental Setup
Datasets We evaluate the attacks on two offline models on
ImageNet[11] and CelebA[24] and two online face recogni-
tion APIs Face++[26] and Azure[28]. We use a pretrained
ResNet-18 model as the target model for ImageNet and fine-
tune a pretrained ResNet-18 model to classify among 100
people in CelebA. We randomly select 50 pairs from the
ImageNet/CelebA validation set that are correctly classified
by the model as the source and target images.
Attack Setup Following the standard setting in [9], we
use ξt = ||x(t−1)adv − xtgt||2/
√
t as the size in each step to-
wards the gradient. We use δt = 1m ||x(t−1)adv − xtgt||2 as the
perturbation size and B = 100 queries in the Monte Carlo
algorithm to estimate the gradient, wherem = 3×224×224
is the input dimension in each Monte Carlo step.
We provide two evaluation metrics to evaluate the at-
tack performance. The first is the average Mean Square Er-
ror (MSE) curve between the target image and the adversar-
ial example in each step, indicating the magnitude of pertur-
bation. The smaller the perturbation is, the more similar the
adversarial example is with the target-image, thus providing
better attack quality. The second is the attack success rate
based on a limited number of queries, where the ‘success’
is defined as reaching certain specific MSE threshold. The
less queries we need in order to reach a certain perturbation
threshold, the more efficient the attack method is.
As for the dimension-reduced subspace, we use the di-
mension reduction factor r = 4 in spatial transformed and
low frequency subspace, which gives a 9408 dimensional
subspace. In order to generate the Intrinsic Component
Subspace, we first generate a set of image gradient vec-
tors on the space. We average over the gradient of input
w.r.t. five different pretrained substitute models - ResNet-
50[17], DenseNet-121[18], VGG16[33], WideResNet[41]
and GoogleNet[36]. We use part of the ImageNet validation
set (280000 images) to generate the gradient vectors. Fi-
nally we adopt the scalable approximate PCA algorithm[16]
to extract the top 9408 major components as the intrinsic
component subspace.
5.2. Commercial Online APIs
Various companies provide commercial APIs (Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces) of trained models for differ-
ent tasks such as face recognition. Developers of down-
stream tasks can pay for the services and integrate the APIs
into their applications. Note that although typical platform
APIs provide the developers the confidence score of classes
associated with their final predictions, the end-user using
the final application would not have access to the scores in
most cases. For example, some of Face++’s partners use
the face recognition techniques for log-in authentication in
mobile phones [27], where the user only knows the final
decision (whether they pass the verification or not).
We choose two representative platforms for our real-
world experiments based on only the final prediction. The
first is Face++ from MEGVII[26], and the second is Mi-
crosoft Azure[28]. Face++ offers a ‘compare’ API [26]
with which we can send an HTTPS request with two im-
ages in the form of byte strings, and get a prediction confi-
dence of whether the two images contain the same person.
In all the experiments we consider a confidence greater than
50% meaning the two images are tagged as the same person.
Azure has a slightly more complicated interface. To com-
pare two images, each image first needs to pass a ‘detect’
API call [28] to get a list of detected faces with their land-
marks, features, and attributes. Then the features of both
images are fed into a ‘verify’ function [29] to get a final
decision of whether they belong to the same person or not.
The confidence is also given, but we do not need it for our
experiments since we only leverage the binary prediction
for practical purpose.
In the experiments, we use the examples in Figure 4 as
source-image and target-image. More specifically, we use a
man-woman face as the source-target pair for the ‘compare’
API Face++, and we use a cat-woman face as the pair for
the ‘detect’ API Azure face detection.
Discretization Optimization for Attacking APIs The
attack against online APIs suffers from the problem of ‘dis-
cretization’. That is, in the attack process we assume the
pixel values to be continuous in [0, 1], but we need to round
it into 8-bit floating point in the uploaded RGB images
when querying the online APIs. This would cause error in
the Monte Carlo gradient estimation format in Equation 3
since the real perturbation between the last boundary-image
and the new query image after rounding is different from the
weighted perturbation vector δub.
In order to mitigate this problem, we perform discretiza-
tion locally. Let Prd be a projection from a continuous im-
(a) Person 1 (b) Person 2 (c) No-face
Figure 4: The source and target images for online API ex-
periments. All images are resized to 3 × 224 × 224. Im-
age 4a is the target-image for both APIs. Image 4b is the
source-image for attacking Face++ ‘compare’ API, and 4c
the source-image for Azure ‘detect’ API.
age xc to a discrete image xd = Prd(xc). Let δu′b =
Prd(x+ δub)− x, the new gradient estimation format be-
comes:
∇˜f = 1
B
B∑
i=1
φ(Prd(x+ δub))u
′
b. (13)
5.3. Experimental Results on Offline Models
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed methods,
we first show the average MSE during the attack process
of ImageNet and CelebA using different number of queries
in Figure 5a and Figure 5c respectively. We can see that
all the three proposed query efficient methods outperform
HSJA significantly. We also show the attack success rate
given different number of queries in Table 1 using differ-
ent MSE requirement as the threshold. In addition, we pro-
vide the attack success rate curve in Figure 5b and 5d using
10−3 as the threshold for ImageNet and 10−5 for CelebA
to illustrate convergence trend for the proposed QEBA-S,
QEBA-F, and QEBA-I, comparing with the baseline HJSA.
We observe that sampling in the optimized subspaces re-
sults in a better performance than sampling from the orig-
inal space. The spatial transforamed subspace and low-
frequency subspace show a similar behaviour since both of
them rely on the local continuity. The intrinsic component
subspace does not perform better than the other two ap-
proaches, and the potential reason is that we are only using
280000 cases to find intrinsic components on the 150528-
dimensional space. Therefore, the extracted components
may not be optimal. We also observe that the face recog-
nition model is much easier to attack than the ImageNet
model, since the face recognition model has fewer classes
(100) rather than 1000 as of ImageNet.
A qualitative example process of attacking the ImageNet
model using different subspaces is shown in Figure 6. In
this example, the MSE (shown as d in the figures) reaches
below 1 × 10−3 using around 2K queries when samlping
from the subspaces, and it is already hard to tell the adver-
sarial perturbations in the examples. When we further tune
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(b) The attack success rate with
threshold 10−3 on ImageNet.
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Figure 5: The attack results on ImageNet and CelebA datasets.
Table 1: Attack success rate using different number of queries and different MSE thresholds.
# Queries = 5000 # Queries = 10000 # Queries = 20000
MSE
threshold HJSA -S
QEBA
-F -I HJSA -S
QEBA
-F -I HJSA -S
QEBA
-F -I
ImageNet
0.01 0.76 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.001 0.16 0.40 0.42 0.36 0.50 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.84 0.98 0.96 0.98
0.0001 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.32 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.70 0.66 0.68
CelebA
0.01 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.001 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.0001 0.76 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source Image
Target Image
d=9.74e-03 d=5.40e-03 d=1.40e-03 d=1.18e-04
HS
JA
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Figure 6: An example of attacking ImageNet trained model
based on different subspaces.
the adv-image using 10K queries, it reaches lower MSE.
5.4. Results of Attacking Online APIs
The results of attacking online APIs Face++ and Azure
are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 respectively. The labels
on the y-axis indicate the methods. Each column represents
successful attack instances with increasing number of API
calls. As is the nature of boundary-based attack, all images
are able to produce successful attack. The difference lies in
the quality of attack instances.
For attacks on Face++ ‘compare’ API, the source-image
is a man and the target-image is a woman as shown in Fig-
ure 4. Notice the man’s eyes appear in a higher position in
the source-image than the woman in the target-image be-
cause of the pose. All the instances on the first row in Fig-
ure 7 based on HJSA attacks contain two pairs of eyes. The
MSE scores (d in the figures) also confirm that the distance
between the attack instance and the target-image does not
go down much even with more than 6000 queries. On the
other hand, our proposed methods QEBA- can optimize at-
tack instances with smaller magnitude of perturbation more
efficiently. The perturbations are also smoother.
The attack results on Azure ‘detect’ API show similar
observations. The source-image is a cat and the target-
image is the same woman. Sampling from the original high-
dimensional space (HJSA) gives us attack instances that
d=1.52e-02
HJ
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d=1.48e-02 d=1.48e-02 d=1.46e-02 d=1.44e-02
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QE
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d=1.47e-02
#q=139
QE
BA
-I
d=1.60e-02
#q=614
d=1.41e-02
#q=1831
d=1.27e-02
#q=3689
d=8.24e-03
#q=6147
Figure 7: Comparison of attacks on Face++ ‘compare’ API.
Goal: obtain an image that is tagged as ‘same person’ with
the source-image person 2 (Figure 4b) by the API when hu-
mans can clearly see person 1 here.
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Figure 8: Comparison of attacks on Azure ‘detect’ API.
Goal: get an image that is tagged as ‘no face’ by the API
when humans can clearly see a face there. The source-
image is a cat as shown in Figure 4c.
presents two cat ear shapes at the back of the human face
as shown in the first row in Figure 8. With the proposed
query efficient attacks, the perturbations are smoother. The
distance metric (d) also demonstrates the superiority of the
proposed methods.
6. Related Work
Boundary-based Attack Boundary Attack [2] is one
of the first work that uses final decisions of a classifier
to perform blackbox attacks. The attack process starts
from the source-image, which is classified as the adver-
sarial malicious-class. Then it employs a reject sampling
mechanism to find a boundary-image that still belongs to
the malicious-class by performing random walk along the
boundary. The goal is to minimize the distance between
the boundary-image and the target-image. However, as the
steps taken are randomly sampled, the convergence of this
method is slow and the query number is large.
Several techniques have been proposed to improve the
performance of Boundary Attack. [3, 35, 15] propose to
choose the random perturbation in each step more wisely
instead of Gaussian perturbation, using Perlin noise, alpha
distribution and DCT respectively. [19, 21, 23, 9] propose a
similar idea - approximating the gradient around the bound-
ary using Monte Carlo algorithm.
There are two other blackbox attacks which are not based
on the boundary. [10] proposes to transform the boundary-
based output into a continuous metric, so that the score-
based attack techniques can be adopted. [12] adopts evolu-
tion algorithm to achieve the decision-based attack against
face recognition system.
Dimension Reduction in Score-based Attack Another
line of work involves the dimension reduction techniques
only for the score-based attacks, which requires access to
the prediction of confidence for each class. In [15], the au-
thors draw intuition from JPEG codec [38] image compres-
sion techniques and propose to use discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) for generating low frequency adversarial per-
turbations to assist score-based adversarial attack. Auto-
Zoom [37] trains an auto-encoder offline with natural im-
ages and uses the decoder network as a dimension reduction
tool. Constrained perturbations in the latent space of the
auto-encoder are generated and passed through the decoder.
The resulting perturbation in the image space is added to the
benign one to obtain a query sample.
7. Conclusion
Overall we propose QEBA, a general query-efficient
boundary-based blackbox attack framework. We in addi-
tion explore three novel subspace optimization approaches
to reduce the number of queries from spatial, frequency,
and intrinsic components perspectives. Based on our theo-
retic analysis, we show the optimality of the proposed sub-
space based gradient estimation compared with the estima-
tion over the original space. Extensive results show that
the proposed QEBA significantly reduces the required num-
ber of queries and yields high quality adversarial examples
against both offline and onlie real-world APIs.
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove a lemma of the gradient estimation quality
which samples from the entire subspace:
Lemma 1. For a boundary point x, suppose that S(x)
has L-Lipschitz gradients in a neighborhood of x, and that
u1, . . . ,uB are sampled from the unit ball in Rm and or-
thogonal to each other. Then the expected cosine similarity
between ∇˜S and ∇S can be bounded by:(
2
(
1− ( Lδ
2||∇S||2 )
2
)m−1
2
− 1
)
cm
√
B
m
(14)
≤E[ cos(∇˜S,∇S)] (15)
≤cm
√
B
m
(16)
where cm is a constant related with m and can be bounded
by cm ∈ (2/pi, 1). In particular, we have:
lim
δ→0
E
[
cos(∇˜S,∇S)] = cm√B
m
. (17)
Proof. Let u1, . . . ,uB be the random orthonormal vectors
sampled from Rm. We expand the vectors to an orthonor-
mal basis in Rm: q1 = u1, . . . ,qB = uB ,qB+1, . . . ,qm.
Hence, the gradient direction can be written as:
∇S
||∇S||2 =
m∑
i=1
aiqi (18)
where ai = 〈 ∇S||∇S||2 ,qi〉 and its distribution is equivalent
to the distribution of one coordinate of an (m − 1)-sphere.
Then each ai follows the probability distribution function:
pa(x) =
(1− x2)m−32
B(m−12 , 12 )
, x ∈ (−1, 1) (19)
where B is the beta function. According to the conclusion in
the proof of Theorem 1 in [9], if we let w = Lδ2||∇S||2 , then
it always holds true that φ(x + δui) = 1 when ai > w, -1
when ai < −w regardless of ui and the decision boundary
shape. Hence, we can rewrite φi in term of ai:
φi = φ(x+ δui) =

1, if ai ∈ [w, 1)
−1, if ai ∈ (−1,−w]
undetermined, otherwise
(20)
Therefore, the estimated gradient can be rewritten as:
∇˜S = 1
B
B∑
i=1
φiui (21)
Combining Eqn. 18 and 21, we can calculate the cosine
similarity:
E
[
cos(∇˜S,∇S)] = E
a1,...,aB
∑B
i=1 aiφi√
B
(22)
=
√
B · E
a1
[
a1φ1
]
(23)
In the best case, φ1 has the same sign with a1 everywhere
on (−1, 1); in the worst case, φ1 has different sign with a1
on (−w,w). In addition, pa(x) is symmetric on (−1, 1).
Therefore, the expectation is bounded by:
2
∫ 1
w
pa(x) · xdx− 2
∫ w
0
pa(x) · xdx (24)
≤ E
a1
[
a1φ1
]
(25)
≤2
∫ 1
0
pa(x) · xdx (26)
By calculating the integration, we have:(
2
(
1− w2
)m−1
2
− 1
)
· 2
√
B
B(m−12 , 12 ) · (m− 1)
(27)
≤E
[
cos(∇˜S,∇S)] (28)
≤ 2
√
B
B(m−12 , 12 ) · (m− 1)
(29)
The only problem is to calculate B(m−12 , 12 ) · (m − 1). It
is easy to prove by scaling that B(m−12 , 12 ) · (m − 1) ∈
(2
√
m,pi
√
m). Hence we can get the conclusion in the the-
orem.
Having Lemma 1, Theorem 1 follows by noticing that
E
[
cos(∇˜S,∇S)] = ρE[ cos(∇˜S, projspan(W )(∇S))].
